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I. INTRODUCTION: DID THE ROBERTS COURT KILL CLASS ACTIONS?
The first ten years of the Roberts Court have seen increased
attention to questions arising from the prosecution and defense of actions
brought as class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Class
actions received sporadic attention by the Supreme Court in the last
decade of the 20th Century, most notably in addressing controversies
generated by the attempted use of the class action mechanism to settle
mass claims arising from present—and future—exposure to asbestos.1 In
contrast, the Roberts Court seems to have revisited class actions
repeatedly, in a wide array of procedural and substantive contexts,
ranging from interpreting the expanded federal diversity jurisdiction
provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA),2 to the
interplay of Rule 23’s procedural prescriptions with elements of
substantive proof in securities, antitrust, employment, and consumer
disputes. It is in this general category that the most noteworthy—or most
notorious—Roberts Court decisions cluster. These decisions include
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,3 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,4
Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,5 Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans
& Trust Funds,6 Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,7 and
1. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (applying all 23(b)(3)
requirements, except trial manageability, to settlement class certification and requiring structural
assurances to protect against intra-class conflicts); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999)
(limiting the availability of Rule 23(b)(1)(B)’s “limited fund” rationale for the certification of nonopt out settlement classes).
2. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 [hereinafter CAFA], Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4,
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d), 1453, 1711-15, 2074). The CAFA enactment process
was intensely political. As many commentators, and more than a few courts have noted, the partisan
drive for CAFA’s expedited passage sacrificed the niceties of coherence, and internal consistence,
and dispensed with the inclusion of processes that would have assisted courts in managing the
resulting influx of state law class actions into the federal courts, such as a uniform choice of law
rule. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, CAFA Judicata: A Tale of Waste and
Politics, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1553 (2008) (recording the legislative history and aftermath of CAFA);
Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Back-door Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353,
1417 (2006); Linda J. Silberman, Choice of Law in National Class Actions: Should CAFA Make a
Difference?, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 54 (2009).
3. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
4. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
5. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
6. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
7. Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2398 (2014), vac. 718 F.3d 423
(5th Cir. 2013) (declining to overturn Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the landmark
decision establishing the fraud on the market presumption of investor reliance in publicly traded
securities).
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American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.8
Within this cluster of cases, three cases demonstrate the
significance of Roberts Court jurisprudence. Wal-Mart dispersed
perhaps the largest nationwide employment discrimination class ever
certified. Concepcion exalted the Federal Arbitration Act over the rights
of consumers to bring their grievances, either individually or in class
actions, to court.9 Italian Colors rebuffed businesses in the same way. In
the eyes of many—especially those disappointed by the outcomes—
Dukes, Concepcion, and Italian Colors are political, or at least reflective
of dominantly powerful interests and ideologies at the expense of those
less favored (or perhaps fortunate) regarding resonance with the hearts
and minds of the necessary five justices. To the extent this is true, the
amelioration of these outcomes may also be political—legislation
amending or clarifying the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA),10 for
example, may restore access to the civil justice system on the part of
consumers and small businesses—once outcry at the loss of a longestablished (and long taken for granted) right to trial is transformed into
political pressure. Meanwhile, despite Concepcion and Italian Colors,
consumers, employees, and businesses persist in their quest to retain, or
regain, their right of access to the public fora of the federal (and state)
courts; and appellate courts have kept unconscionability alive, declining
to enforce mandatory arbitration and class action ban provisions in cases
where case-specific facts render enforcement particularly unfair.11 The
Roberts Court’s enthusiasm for arbitration over traditional litigation may
wane as arbitration in practice fails to deliver on promised efficiency and
economy. Those who overreach will be rebuffed as courts reject
arbitration clauses that are inserted without notice or consent, devoid of
consideration, or overly oppressive in operation. Still, it is disconcerting
that the Concepcion consumers may have inadvertently traded their
birthright of access to the courts for a not-so-free cellphone, and the
deterrent and prophylactic functions of the class suit may go missing in
action until some legislative or jurisprudential means are found to restore
them. Hope springs eternal.
Plaintiffs’ counsel and consumer advocates, not without reason,
have tended to see the currently-configured Supreme Court as hostile to
8. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 ( 2013).
9. See also Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animal Feeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
10. Federal Arbitration Act, ch. 392, 61 Stat. 670 (1947) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §
1, et seq.).
11. See, e.g., Tina Wolfson & Bradley King, Even After Concepcion and Italian Colors, Some
Arbitration Agreements Are Not Enforceable, 62 FED. LAW. 19 (2015).
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class actions. It can be difficult to disentangle the Court’s skeptical
scrutiny of the procedural mechanism of Rule 23 class certification from
suspicion of an underlying hostility toward the claims—and claimants—
themselves in the cases most frequently cited as evidence of this
hostility. Cases in point: Wal-Mart (rejecting the class certification quest
of a nationwide class of women employees alleging gender
discrimination in promotion) and Concepcion (throwing cell phone
customers out of court by enforcing mandatory arbitration clauses in the
fine print of form contracts). Wal-Mart and Concepcion delivered much
greater impact on employees, consumers, and their class action efforts
than occurred with Comcast, and the effects of Wal-Mart and
Concepcion as set-backs may be ameliorated over time. There have been
many defeats, but some victories, in employment cases since Wal-Mart;
and the judicial infatuation with forced arbitration clauses may be giving
way to potential legislative and regulatory reform, spurred by public
outrage.12 Meanwhile, in Amgen and Halliburton, the same court upheld
investors’ rights and preserved presumptions that reflect realities of the
securities markets and facilitate aggregate proof of liability.13 The Court
in Comcast,14 like the Roman god Janus, looks both ways: it tightens up
the proof of classwide import but does not change the structure of Rule
23 to require that all liability and damage questions be capable of
classwide proof.
This Article does not delve deeply into the substantive issues of
Wal-Mart, Concepcion, or Italian Colors. Others have done so, and will
continue to do so, with greater expertise and insight.15 My focus is on
how Rule 23 has fared, structurally and practically, in the aftermath of
the “common answer” formulation of Wal-Mart; three other decisions of
the Roberts Court, Dukes, Amgen, and Comcast; and three cases that the
Roberts Court did not ultimately take in the wake of Amgen and
Comcast: its denials of review in Whirlpool,16 Butler,17 and Deepwater.18
12. Cereal maker General Mills, for example, tried last year to activate mandatory arbitration
provisions for those who “liked” it on Facebook. Like turned to anger, and on April 19, 2014,
General Mills yielded to public pressure, dropped its forced arbitration clause, and apologized to
consumers. See Kirstie Foster, We’ve Listened – and We’re Changing Our Legal Terms Back,
TASTE OF GEN. MILLS (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.blog.generalmills.com/2014/04/weve-listenedand-were-changing-our-legal-terms-back-to-what-they-were//.
13. See supra notes 6-7.
14. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
15. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A
Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 294 (2014); Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729 (2013); Paul D. Carrington, Protecting the Rights of Citizens to Aggregate
Small Claims Against Businesses, 46 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 537 (2013).
16. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838 (6th Cir.
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Also discussed is the newly intense debate on the use of cy pres,
catalyzed by Chief Justice Roberts’ extraordinary “Statement”
accompanying the denial of certiorari in Marek v. Lane.19 This Article’s
brief Wal-Mart discussion focuses on the case as an instance—perhaps
anomalous—of the Court’s indifference to the structural constraints of
Rule 23 itself in transporting the requirement for predominance of
common issues from Rule 23(b)(3) to Rule 23(b)(2). This structural
disruption at once dismayed employment rights advocates and,
intentionally or not, provided a practical tool for the design and trial of
class cases by plaintiffs.
II. AMGEN, COMCAST, AND RULE 23’S PROCEDURAL/MERITS DIVIDE
Amgen and Comcast, two decisions issued in the same term,
highlight the Court’s treatment of the emerging problem of reconciling
the determination of whether Rule 23’s class certification criteria are
met, which must be done in every class action, with the ultimate
adjudication on the merits, which must be avoided at the class
certification stage. Courts have long recognized that the merits do matter
in class certification, because the goal of the class certification exercise
is to determine which of the questions of law or fact raised by a case can
and should be decided on a classwide basis at trial; and whether these
classwide questions are sufficiently significant, vis-à-vis the overall
litigation, to warrant utilization of the class form to decide them.
Amgen20 made it clear that courts need not decide any question on
its merits as a prerequisite to characterizing that issue as a classwide
question and granting class certification. Comcast, which held that the
expert methodology submitted to support class certification must
actually match the surviving damages theories in the case,21 dashed the
hopes of some class action opponents because it did not require that
damages, as well as liability questions, be answerable on a classwide
basis in order to fulfill Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014).
17. Butler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
1277 (2014).
18. This trend is described in Miller, supra note 15, at 296-98.
19. “Though not expressly stated in Rule 23, many courts have read an implicit requirement
of class ‘definiteness and ascertainability’ into the Rule.” Johnson v. Nextel Commc’ns, Inc., 293
F.R.D. 660, 669 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Although some courts use the term “definitiveness” and others
“ascertainability,” the idea is the same. WILLIAM RUBENSTEIN ET AL., NEWBERG ON CLASS
ACTIONS § 3:1, n.1 (5th ed. 2014) [hereinafter NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS].
20. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013).
21. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
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Anti-class action forces have been pushing, increasingly hard, on
two concepts to defeat class certification: (1) the so-called implied
requirement of “ascertainability”22 and (2) Article III standing,
sometimes expressed as an attack on the “no injury class.” The
defendants’ petitions for certiorari in the “Whirlpool” cases (Whirlpool
and Butler) and in Deepwater raised these issues, as discussed more
thoroughly below. Although the existence of a circuit split was urged in
each petition, recent appellate decisions, both before and after the circuit
opinions in Whirlpool, Butler, and Deepwater, have consistently
reaffirmed two principles. First, ascertainability is satisfied by the
utilization of a specific and objective class definition. Second, Article III
standing requirements are, and must be, the same for class actions as
they are for individual suits, such that absent class members, like
individual plaintiffs, need not prove the merits of their claims, or the
existence or quantum of damages, as a predicate of standing at the pretrial stage or as a prerequisite to class certification.23
In a trend that began prior to the Roberts Court regime, the early
practice of addressing class certification at the pleading stage, based
solely on the allegations of the complaint, had evolved to encompass an
ever-greater examination of the underlying claims and issues as they
would actually be presented at trial.24 Such an examination typically
requires some discovery, occurs after other challenges to the pleadings
are resolved, and pushes class certification from the beginning of the
sequence of pretrial motions, closer and closer to the point of trial, such
that class certification may occur at, or even after, the summary
judgment stage. This ongoing shift was ultimately reflected in the 2003
amendments to Rule 23, which changed the original 1966 prescription
that class certification be determined “as early as practicable” in the
action, to the contemporary requirement that class certification be
determined “at an early practicable time.”25
This temporal shift both accommodated the need and facilitated the
practice of considering the merits—to the extent these were relevant to
whether Rule 23’s criteria were met—but also enabled some mischief, in
the nature of what could be called “merits creep,” and resulted in
increasing confusion regarding just how to differentiate a merits review
for the sole purpose of determining whether class action criteria are met,
22. See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 19, §§ 3:1-3:7, 7:27-7:28 (on
“ascertainability” or “definiteness” as an “implicit” request of Rule 23(a)).
23. See, specifically, the discussions of Deepwater and Nexium, infra, Part II.
24. This trend is described in Miller, supra note 15, at 296-98.
25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(A).
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from deciding the merits for the merits’ sake (and, not incidentally, from
encroaching upon the factfinder’s role at trial).
It was perhaps inevitable that class action opponents would attempt
to use the judge-created ascertainability requirement and distort Article
III standing concepts to promote the notion that Rule 23 (or perhaps due
process) did not permit the inclusion, within a class definition, of absent
class members who could not prove their individual damages claims. At
their extremes, these arguments completely upend the natural sequence
of events in any case, beginning to appear much like the trial presided
over by the Red Queen in chapter 11 of Lewis Carroll’s Alice in
Wonderland, at which the jury was repeatedly urged to consider its
verdict before and during the presentation of evidence.26
These arguments also represent a conflation of the distinct concepts
of class membership and entitlement to damages. The purpose of
defining a class with precision is to guarantee its preclusive effect:
questions of law and fact decided on a classwide basis bind the class
members, thus eliminating sequential, piecemeal litigation and the
potential for inconsistent outcomes on the same questions.27 In most
class actions, class members who win on liability must then, in some
individualized fashion, prove up their own damages.28 The
ascertainability doctrine, as derived from the express Rule 23(c)
requirement of a definite (or defined) class,29 enables this stage of
individualized proof to be administratively feasible to administer.30 But
nothing in Rule 23 contemplates that this final stage must precede class
certification itself. Indeed, the near-inevitable31 inclusion of “uninjured”
members within a class benefits defendants, because it precludes a
second bite at the apple by plaintiffs excluded or expelled from the class.
As discussed in Parts V and VI of this article, attempts to enlist
Comcast, in particular, in the cause of imposing a pre-determination-ofinjury requirement upon class certification have been unavailing.
III. DUKES V. WAL-MART: PREDOMINANCE IS THE NEW COMMONALITY
The Wal-Mart majority declared:

26. LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND ch. 11 (1865).
27. See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 19, § 3:6.
28. See, e.g., Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 756 (7th Cir. 2014) (post-liability
individualized proof of damages remains “routine” in class actions).
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
30. See supra note 19.
31. See In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015).
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The crux of this case is commonality—the rule requiring a plaintiff to
show that ‘there are questions of law or fact common to the class.’
Rule 23(a)(2). That language is easy to misread, since ‘[a]ny competently crafted class complaint literally raises common questions.’
[quoting Richard A. Nagareda], Reciting these questions is not sufficient to obtain class certification . . . . Their claims must depend upon a
common contention—for example, the assertion of discriminatory bias
on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention, moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution—which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve
an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one
stroke. ‘What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of
common questions—even in droves—but, rather the capacity of a
classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class
are what have the potential to impede the generation of common an32
swers.’ [quoting Nagareda].

The Wal-Mart majority emphasized that “for purposes of Rule
23(a)(2) ‘[e]ven a single [common] question’ will do,” again quoting
Richard Nagareda33 However, a funny thing happened on the way to the
reversal of Rule 23(b)(2) class certification in Dukes. The majority
opinion mixed Nagareda’s insights on Rule 23(b)(2) prerequisites with
the crucial insight made, by Nagareda himself, in the specific context of
addressing Rule 23(b)(3) predominance. In its immediate context, the
critical passage from Nagareda’s article, Class Certification in the Age
of Aggregate Proof, cited by the majority in Wal-Mart, reads as follows:
Formulation of Rule 23 in terms of predominant common “questions”
and generally applicable misconduct obscures the crucial line between
dissimilarity and similarity within the class. The existence of a common “question” does not form the crux of the class certification inquiry, at least not literally, or else the first-generation case law would
have been correct to regard the bare allegations of the class complaint
as dispositive on the certification question. Any competently crafted
class complaint literally raises common “questions.” What matters to
class certification, however, is not the raising of common “questions”—even in droves—but, rather, the capacity of a class-wide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the
litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the

32. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550-51 ( 2011) (emphasis in original).
33. Id. at 2556; Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the
Class Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149 (2003).
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Wal-Mart thus arguably elided predominance and commonality,
imposing upon the commonality requirement of Rule 23(a)(2)—one that
it reaffirms may be satisfied by “even a single common question”—with
the more exacting “predominance” requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). Rule
23(a)(3) requirements traditionally, and structurally, have not applied to
Rule 23(b)(2) class actions, including the claims presented in the WalMart case. Importation of what is functionally a “predominance”
requirement into all class actions, has been the source of much of the
dismay engendered by Wal-Mart. It has also served as a springboard for
the recurring argument (which ultimately failed to win the day in
Comcast) that “predominance,” in turn, must mean totality: all questions
of law and fact in a case must be susceptible of classwide treatment in
order to obtain class certification.
Perhaps it was the structural move by the majority in Wal-Mart that
led the petitioners in Comcast, and those who looked forward to a
Supreme Court decision in Comcast as authority, to advocate for a new
standard of class certification that would trump the formal structure and
express provisions of Rule 23 itself,35 but it was not to be.
IV. THE NECESSITY OF CLASS ACTION EXCEPTIONALISM
As restated in the majority opinion in Wal-Mart, “the class action is
‘an exception to the usual rule that litigation is conducted by and on
behalf of the individual named parties only.’”36 A class action is not
simply the mass joinder of numerous individuals. If it were, it would be
an unnecessary redundancy in the Federal Civil Rules. Rules 18, 19, and
20 already provide for such joinders. Rule 23’s exceptionalism lies not
only in its availability when the individual joinder of all interested is
“impracticable” due to sheer numbers, but in its essential nature as a
representative suit. Earlier iterations of a class action rule, such as

34. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 97, 131-32 (2009).
35. Rule 23(c)(1)(B) provides that an order “that certifies a class action must define the class
and the class claims, issues, or defenses . . .,” and Rule 23(c)(4) provides that, “[w]hen appropriate,
an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.” FED. R.
CIV. P. 23. These provisions, among others, contemplate that some claims or questions within a
class action will remain for individualized determination once the common questions have been
decided. Nothing in Rule 23 requires or suggests that all questions within a class action must be
common ones.
36. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550 (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 700-01
(1979)).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

9

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 3

766

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:757

Federal Equity Rule 38, articulate this exceptional nature starkly,
providing: “When the question is one of common or general interest to
many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or
defend for the whole.”37
The Roberts Court has displayed a seeming preference for the 1930
FAA over the decades of legal scholarship and jurisprudence that
actually applied a bitter lesson of the Great Depression. The market,
unconstrained by regulation, will not deter itself, and the function of the
class suit is not only, or not all, about compensation. Thanks to the
endorsement of such use by Concepcion and Italian Colors, mandatory
solo arbitration precludes court and collective action by consumers and
small businesses. For them, the enforcement/deterrent function of the
class suit is down, but not out. In the field of securities litigation, where
it arose, and in what remains of consumer litigation, where courts readily
adopted it, the endurance of the class action as a deterrent force is intact,
unthreatened by Comcast and Halliburton, and affirmatively assisted by
Amgen.
Chastised by the crash of a free-ranging stock market, some of the
law and economics’ founding fathers called upon the nascent class
action to enforce new market regulations and prevent repeat financial
disputes. Kalven and Rosenfield, in their seminal Function of the Class
Suit article,38 presented the class action as the solution to the problem of
unconstrained mass economies that “modern society” exposes us to
“group injuries” for which we cannot effectively seek redress, either
because we “do not know enough or because such redress is
disproportionately expensive.”39 Seeking compensation for ourself alone
does not work, even if our individual stake is high enough. Effective
deterrence does not come from the bottom up.
“If each is left to assert his rights if and when he can, there will at
best be a random and fragmentary enforcement, if there is any at all.”40
The class solution for the deliverance gap has evolved, endured, and
thrived in shareholder litigation, and Amgen and Halliburton safeguard
its continuing health. A generation after Kalven and Rosenfield wrote,

37. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 19, § 1:13 (quoting Equity Rule 38) (citation
omitted).
38. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. CHI. L. REV. 684, 686 (1941).
39. Id.
40. Id.
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the courts adopted their deterrent rationale to consumer class actions.41
California wrote this purpose into—and inserted Rule 23’s provisions
verbatim in—the substantive provisions of its Civil Code to create the
Consumer Legal Remedies Act.42 Today’s law and economic
commentators continue to recognize the essential deterrent function of
Rule 23(b)(3) consumer suits, beyond their compensatory function.43
To make a representative action work, “a class representative must
be part of the class and ‘possess the same interest and suffer the same
injury’ as the class members.”44 From these elementary propositions,
ironically, class certification opponents have been emboldened to thwart
class treatment by front-loading proof of damages by class members
(which is not the same as certification, for determination at trial, of a
classwide injury) and/or to extend Article III standing requirements,
through a class-actions-only requirement that absent class members
prove injury, by proving damages, as a prerequisite to standing.45 The
former ignores the representative nature of a class suit by treating it as
just another bottoms-up aggregation of individual claims.
As the Roberts Court, like its predecessors, has noted, the class
action is “an exception” to individual litigation, either singly or en
masse. This exception exists because it is necessary. In our mass society,
it serves functions of preclusion, efficiency, and deterrence, where
significant common questions are present, that individual actions cannot
perform at all; and that even mass joinders of individual claims (under
Federal Rules 18-20 or through centralization as multi-district litigation
under 28 U.S.C. 1407) cannot always perform as well. The fact that class
actions are not the same as other joinder mechanisms is demonstrated by
Rule 23 itself, through Rule 23(b)(3)’s “superiority” requirement. To

41. See, e.g., Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 800, 807-08 (Cal. 1971) (en banc).
42. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750, et seq (West, Westlaw through Ch.2 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.).
The act specifies certain unfair or deceptive practices and provides that a damages class action may
be filed for practices effecting consumers similarly situated. Id. §§ 1770; 1781.
43. See, e.g., Brant T. Fitzpatrick, Do Class Action Lawyers Make Too Little?, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 2043, 2046-47 (2010) (positing provocatively that deterrence is the true function of small
damages consumer class actions and that compensation could be dispensed with). The Roberts
Court-era class action decisions of the Seventh Circuit, the birthplace of law and economics, are
noteworthy for their recognition of the efficiency and deterrence advantages of the class
mechanism. See infra Part V.D.E.
44. E. Texas Motor Freight Systems, Inc. v. Rodriquez, 431 U.S. 395, 403 (1977) (quoting
Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop The War, 418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974)). Both of these are
quoted in Wal-Mart. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2550 ( 2011).
45. As noted in Nexium, the latter argument would violate due process (and, incidentally, the
Rules Enabling Act) by placing higher standards on plaintiffs as members of a class than they would
face as named litigants. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015).
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certify a Rule 23(b)(3) damages class, the court must find “that a class
action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy.”46 Sometimes, as Wal-Mart itself
acknowledges, it is better to utilize a representative action to decide the
important questions of law or fact shared by the class constituency—
usually questions that relate to liability (that is, to the defendant’s
conduct)—before proceeding (if necessary) to questions of damages.47
Requiring, essentially, that all absent class members prove their
damages before any class can be certified—a completely inefficient type
of reverse bifurcation—is unnecessary to a proper class certification
exercise, would nullify the deterrence function of the class suit, and
would eliminate the efficiencies and economies that justify the
representative action in the first place. Such insistence has gained no
traction with the Roberts Court, possibly because it is a non sequitur in
the Rule 23 context: it simply would not let Rule 23 be Rule 23.
V. THE POST-AMGEN/COMCAST LANDSCAPE
The big news of 2013 for class action practitioners and pundits was
the Supreme Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,48 which
rejected class certification in an antitrust action. Comcast foundered on
the mismatch between the plaintiffs’ damages expert’s report and the
surviving damages theory of the case. Comcast, both before and
immediately after the actual decision was issued, was forecast
(especially on the defense side) to have widespread implications for the
future of class certification across substantive lines. This prediction has
not materialized, for reasons articulated in the First, Fifth, Seventh, and
Ninth Circuit decisions discussed below, consistent with the
overwhelming majority of courts that have applied it in the antitrust
context and beyond.
Concepcion clearly promoted arbitration at the expense of civil
litigation, and Wal-Mart arguably changed class action law by
essentially borrowing an influential articulation of Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance and applying it as the test of Rule 23(a)(2) commonality.49
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
47. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561.
48. Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
49. As noted above, the famous, and practical, admonition of Wal-Mart is that “[w]hat
matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common ‘questions’—even in droves—but,
rather the capacity of a classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation. Dissimilarities within the proposed class are what have the potential to
impede the generation of common answers.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Nagareda,
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However, Comcast did not purport, and has not been interpreted by
appellate or district courts, to change the structure or functions of Rule
23 or to alter class certification standards.50 Instead, Comcast was an
interpretation of Rule 23 as it applied to classwide proof in the anti-trust
context. It is fair to say that class certification is more difficult, more
expensive, and less predictable, across substantive lines, than it was
before Wal-Mart and Comcast, but this is primarily because of the
increasing emphasis, in these decisions and others, on an extensive
factual record and expert reports as predicates to the class certification
decision.
This cumulative emphasis on evidentiary bases for every element of
class certification “proof” has been driving the Rule 23 determination
farther and farther away from the filing of the complaint, divorcing it
from other procedural and pleadings disputes, and pushing it ever-closer
to trial. As a result, class actions are more protracted and costly, and the
class certification is ever more fact-specific. While courts, including the
Supreme Court, continue the mantra that merits determination and class
certification are distinct, certification is more and more merits-inflected,
and the class/merits divide is increasingly fuzzy.51
supra note 34, at 132). The quoted section of this seminal article, authored by the late Professor
Richard Nagareda (one of the Reporters for the ALI’s Aggregate Litigation project), specifically
addressed the predominance of common questions under Rule 23(b)(3), not the less rigorous
commonality standard involved in the Wal-Mart case itself, a Rule 23(b)(2) class action. No matter:
for practical purposes, commonality and predominance have merged.
50. While Comcast would logically be expected to have the greatest impact on class
certification in antitrust cases, courts deciding class certification in such actions have continued to
see the class certification process as straightforward. As observed by one seasoned jurist, Judge
Samuel Conti, in certifying the class in Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, the court’s job
at the antitrust class certification stage is simple: determine whether the putative class showed that
there is a reasonable method for determining, on a classwide basis, the antitrust impact’s effects on
the class members. In re Cathode Ray Tube Antitrust Litig., No. 07-5944 SC, 2013 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 137946 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2013). This is a question of methodology, not merit. As the CRT
court noted, “defendants continually argue . . . that the standard is somehow changed drastically
under [Wal-Mart], Comcast, or Amgen, but the Court does not find that this is true. None of those
cases changed the standard . . . . It is true that the Court’s analysis overlaps with the merits . . . and
requires that the [plaintiffs] make an evidentiary case for predominance, but the defendants are
trying to push the . . . Court toward a full-blown merits analysis, which is forbidden and
unnecessary at this point.” Id. at *79 (internal citations omitted).
51. The circuit courts have struggled to stake the boundary between evaluating the merits for
class certification purposes and determining the merits themselves. See, e.g., Szabo v. Bridgeport
Mach., 249 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2001); In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d Cir.
2006). Commentators have debated the appropriate divide and the extent to which any merit
scrutiny is appropriate at all. See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Review of the Merits in Class Action
Certification, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 51, 84-88 (2004); Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial
Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 324, 349 (2011); Sterg D. Olson, “Chipping Away”: The Misguided Trend Toward Resolving
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The eve-of-trial class certification phenomenon is the result of a
series of decisions, none of which announced any express intent to make
class actions more expensive, time-consuming, or merits-dependent, but
which have, collectively and synergistically, had exactly that effect. In
this era of rising concern over widening income disparity, it is dubious
that making class actions, which are frequently consumers’ only avenue
to an enforceable determination of their claims, a more expensive and
less certain enterprise is sound policy. Nonetheless (outside the Seventh
Circuit, at least), that is often the present reality. The good news for
plaintiffs is that courts, when they do reach the merits of the issues
before them on the class certification inquiry, have been able to parse
Comcast accurately, enabling class certification to proceed. This Article
surveys some of the key post-Comcast decisions in the circuit and
district courts.
A.

(b)(3) or Not (b)(3): What Is Predominance?

The touchstone of class certification under Rule 23(b)(3)—the issue
that remains when Rule 23’s other pertinent requirements (typicality,
commonality, adequacy of representation, and impracticability of
joinder) have been met—is whether “the court finds that the questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to
other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.”52 Rule 23(b)(3) considerately supplies a list of factors,
listed at 23(b)(3)(A)—(D), which may be consulted to determine
whether a class action is “superior” to other available procedures.
However, maddeningly perhaps, Rule 23(b)(3) leaves the concept of
predominance undefined. Courts have striven for decades to reach a
workable definition. Post-Comcast, courts, including the influential
Seventh Circuit, tended to address predominance in practical, functional
terms. Judge Lucy Koh, no stranger to sophisticated high-tech and
intellectual property cases that characterize civil litigation in the
Northern District of California, took a cue from the Seventh Circuit’s
post-Comcast Butler decision and the Supreme Court’s 2013 Amgen
decision, and expressly defined the predominance inquiry as holistic,
qualitative, and pragmatic in her decision denying class certification in
In re Google Inc. Gmail Litigation:

Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S. F. L. REV. 935 (2009).
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
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Importantly, the predominance inquiry is a pragmatic one, in which the
Court does more than just count up common issues and individual issues. As the Seventh Circuit recently stated [in Butler], “predominance
requires a qualitative assessment too; it is not bean counting.” The
Court’s inquiry is not whether common questions predominate with respect to individual elements or affirmative defenses; rather, the inquiry
is a holistic one, in which the Court considers whether overall, consid53
ering the issues to be litigated, common issues will predominate.

Judge Koh’s Gmail decision does not rely entirely on post-Comcast
authority for its predominance analysis. Rather, it examines and
augments the unbroken line of legal development regarding the judicial
view of predominance as a practical inquiry, which focuses on the utility
and superiority of the preclusive classwide trial of important common
questions. This is a trend that Wal-Mart, Comcast, and Amgen have
punctuated, but did not interrupt. As Judge Koh further summarized in
Gmail:
The Court’s predominance analysis “entails identifying the substantive
issues that will control the outcome, assessing which issues will predominate, and then determining whether the issues are common to the
class, a process that ultimately prevents the class from degenerating in54
to a series of individual trials.” To meet the predominance requirement, “common questions must be a significant aspect of the case that
55
can be resolved for all members of the class in a single adjudication.”

B.

“Just the Facts, Ma’am”: Common Answers, Common Sense, and
Predominance

Post-Comcast courts remain practical cats: facts matter. The facts of
a specific case and the expertise that can be mustered to support them
arguably matter more than anything, including the philosophy or
53. In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430-LHK, 2014 WL 1102660, at *12
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2014) (quoting Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir.
2013)) (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013);
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER ET AL., 7AA FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE:
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1778 (3d ed. 2005)).
54. Id. (quoting Gene & Gene LLC v. BioPay, LLC, 541 F.3d 318 326 (5th Cir. 2008))
(citing In re New Motor Vehicles Can. Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 20 (1st Cir. 2008) (“Under
the predominance inquiry, a district court must formulate some prediction as to how specific issues
will play out in order to determine whether common or individual issues predominate in a given
case.”); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1022 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding predominance
“[w]hen common questions present a significant aspect of the case and they can be resolved for all
members of the class a single adjudication”)).
55. Id. (quoting Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1068 (9th Cir. 2014)
(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)).
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ideology of a particular judge. While the Gmail class was denied under
Judge Koh’s rigorous analysis, the same analysis, by the same judge,
applying the same case law, yielded a grant of class certification in In re
High-Tech Employee Antitrust Litigation,56 where multiple rounds of
briefing and hearings were required to satisfy the court that, in this
antitrust action, common questions indeed predominated. In her HighTech decision, Judge Koh discussed, at length, the class certification
standards emerging from Wal-Mart, Comcast, and Amgen, together with
the Ninth Circuit’s own post-Comcast decision, Levya v. Medline
Industries, Inc.,57 which reversed the denial of class certification in a
labor law case. Likewise deployed were the Seventh Circuit’s postComcast Butler decision and its decision in Messner v. North Shore
University HealthSystem,58 which had also reversed a denial of class
certification.
Adding tartness to this mix was the D.C. Circuit’s post-Comcast
decision in In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation,59 in
which the D.C. Circuit held that common questions of fact “cannot
predominate where there exists no reliable means of proving classwide
injury in fact” in the antitrust context. Moreover, it is now “indisputably
the role of the district court to scrutinize the evidence before granting
certification.”60 The High-Tech court combined the qualitative
predominance assessment articulated by the Sixth and Seventh Circuits
in the “washer” cases with the “show me” skepticism of Fuel Surcharge,
which “requires district courts to closely scrutinize factual evidence and
expert reports that demonstrate impact can be proven on a classwide
basis.”61 In both High-Tech and Gmail, Judge Koh took the opportunity
to distill, from the Supreme Court and subsequent appellate decisions, a
holistic predominance analysis to apply in the antitrust context:
Certain principles regarding the legal standard that this Court must apply in determining whether the Technical Class should be certified
emerge from Wal-Mart, Amgen, Comcast, and the circuit court cases
applying this Supreme Court authority. First, and most importantly, the
critical question that this Court must answer is whether common questions predominate over individual questions. In essence, this Court
must determine whether common evidence and common methodology

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
Levya v. Medline Indus., Inc., 716 F.3d 510 (9th Cir. 2013).
Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802 (7th Cir. 2012).
In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litig., 725 F.3d 244, 252-53 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 253.
See High-Tech, 985 F. Supp. 2d at 1186.
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could be used to prove the elements of the underlying cause of action.
Second, in answering this question, this Court must conduct a “rigorous” analysis. This analysis may overlap with the merits, but the inquiry cannot require Plaintiffs to prove elements of their substantive
case at the class certification stage. Third, this Court must determine
not only the [admissibility], of expert evidence that forms the basis of
the methodology that demonstrates whether common questions predominate. Rather, this Court must also determine whether that expert
evidence is persuasive, which may require the Court to resolve methodological disputes. Fourth, the predominance inquiry is not a mechanical inquiry of “bean counting” to determine whether there are more
individual questions than common questions. Instead, the inquiry contemplates a qualitative assessment, which includes a hard look at the
soundness of statistical models. Fifth, Plaintiffs are not required to
show that each element of the underlying cause of action is susceptible
to classwide proof. Rather, they need only show that common ques62
tions will predominate with respect to their case as a whole.

C.

Deepwater Dives Into Wal-Mart, Amgen, and Comcast

In affirming the Rule 23(e) final approval of a comprehensive
economic loss class action settlement to compensate claims arising from
the April 20, 2010 explosion, fire, and resulting catastrophic oil spill
from the drilling rig Deepwater Horizon, the Fifth Circuit had occasion
to discuss the reach of Comcast, which, among other decisions, was
mustered as authority by a handful of settlement objectors against
settlement approval.63
Writing for the majority, Judge W. Eugene Davis first rejected the
necessity or propriety of an evidentiary inquiry into the Article III
standing of absent class members, essentially holding that standing was
a matter of allegation, that is, of pleading rather than proof.64 This
analysis and its conclusion forecast the observations of Justice Antonin
Scalia, writing for a unanimous court in Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control
62. Id. at 1187 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1191,
1194, 1196 (2013); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013); Ellis v. Costco
Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 982 (9th Cir. 2011); Fuel Surcharge, 725 F.3d at 255; Butler v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 801 (7th Cir. 2013)).
63. While the class action settlement itself has been affirmed, disputes over settlement
interpretation remain before the Fifth Circuit. Notwithstanding this activity, over $3 billion thus far
has been distributed to class members. For a detailed description of the economic settlement’s
terms, see Samuel Issacharoff and D. Theodore Rave, The BP Oil Spill Settlement and the Paradox
of Public Litigation, 74 L. L. REV 397 (2014).
64. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 805-06 (5th Cir. 2014), reh’g en banc denied,
756 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014).
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Components, Inc.,65 a non-class action:
[P]roximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing,
which requires only that the plaintiff’s injury be fairly traceable to the
defendant’s conduct . . . . [L]ike any other element of a cause of action,
it must be adequately alleged at the pleading stage in order for the case
to proceed . . . . If a plaintiff’s allegations, taken as true, are insufficient to establish proximate causation, then the complaint must be dismissed; if they are sufficient, then the plaintiff is entitled to an oppor66
tunity to prove them.

Judge Davis rejected the standing challenge as necessitating a
merits inquiry, synthesizing the Supreme Court’s holdings in Amgen and
Wal-Mart as follows:
BP has cited no authority—and we are aware of none—that would
permit an evidentiary inquiry into the Article III standing of absent
class members during class certification and settlement approval under
Rule 23. It is true that a district court may “probe behind the pleadings” when examining whether a specific case meets the requirements
of Rule 23, such as numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy
[citing Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551]. But the Supreme Court cautioned in [Amgen] that “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in
free-ranging merits inquiries at the certification stage. Merits questions
may be considered to the extent—but only to the extent—that they are
relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class cer67
tification are satisfied.

Deepwater settlement objectors had argued that Comcast (decided
three months after the district court’s class certification and settlement
approval orders) “precludes certification under Rule 23(b)(3) in any case
where the class members’ damages are not susceptible to a formula for
classwide measurement.”68 As the Deepwater majority explained, this is
“a misreading of Comcast . . . . Comcast held that a district court errs by
premising its Rule 23(b)(3) decision on a formula for classwide
measurement of damages whenever the damages measured by that
formula are incompatible with the class action’s theory of liability.”69
The Deepwater decision sharpens this point: while the Comcast rule
“may reveal an important defect in many formulas for classwide
65. Lexmark Int’l v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014).
66. Id. at 1391 n.6.
67. Deepwater, 739 F.3d at 805 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541,
2551 (2011); Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1194-95).
68. Id. at 815.
69. Id.
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measurement of damages,” nothing in Comcast mandates a formula for
classwide measurement of damages in all cases.70 The Comcast formula
(damages evidence = damages theory) “has no impact on cases . . . in
which predominance was based not on common issues of damages but
on the numerous common issues of liability.”71
Thus, in the Deepwater economic settlement,
the district court did not include a formula for classwide measurement
of damages among its extensive listing of the “common issues” that
weighed in favor of certification. The district court always recognized
that the class members’ damages “would have to be decided on an individual basis were the cases not being settled,” as would “the extent to
which the Deepwater Horizon incident versus other factors caused a
72
decline in the income of an individual or business.”

The Deepwater settlement class is thus analogous to the defective
washer classes certified in Butler and Whirlpool (both of which were
certified for the classwide determination of common liability issues)
rather than to the antitrust decision in Comcast, in which the plaintiffs
sought an aggregate classwide damages figure, which is the norm in
antitrust cases but unusual in other class actions.73
D.

After Amgen and Comcast Class Certification Decisions In The
Seventh Circuit

Perhaps surprisingly to those who recollect the Seventh Circuit’s
earlier withering critiques of class actions in decisions such as In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc.74 and In re Bridgestone/Firestone Inc.,75 the
Seventh Circuit has emerged in recent years, both pre- and post-WalMart and Comcast, as a leading class action court, most notably in
decisions authored by Judge Richard Posner, the author of RhonePoulenc, and Chief Judge Diane Wood (joined by Judges Cudahy and
Rovner), author of Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., a significant recent

70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See Butler v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 800 (7th Cir. 2013); In re Whirlpool
Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 860 (6th Cir. 2013).
74. In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner, J.) (reversing
class certification of nationwide personal injury class of hemophiliacs alleging negligent HIV
contamination of blood products under multiple states laws).
75. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012 (7th Cir. 2002) (Easterbrook, J.)
(reversing class certification of nationwide consumer fraud class).
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consumer class decision.76 Both Butler decisions (pre- and postComcast) were authored by Judge Posner, and recent months have seen
an additional series of class certification decisions, constituting a
Seventh Circuit, 21st Century jurisprudence of class certification, that
promote the efficiency and utility of the class action mechanism,
particularly with respect to consumer claims. These decisions are not
limited to the consumer arena, however. In the immediate wake of WalMart, Judge Posner authored the affirmation of employment class
certification in McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., an employment discrimination case involving a smaller-scale class
of African American stockbrokers.77
Other post-Wal-Mart, post-Comcast recent Judge Posner class
certification decisions include: Chapman v. Wagener Equities, Inc.;78
Parko v. Shell Oil Co.;79 Driver v. AppleIllinois, LLC;80 Phillips v. Asset
Acceptance, LLC;81 Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enterprise, Inc.;82
Pearson v. NTBY;83 and Redman v. Radioshack Corp.84 In Hughes,
Judge Posner promotes the use of cy pres as an effective remedy in
small-damages suits—bucking a trend of judicial skepticism toward cy
pres:
In a class action, the reason for a remedy modeled on cy pres is to prevent the defendant from walking away from the litigation scot-free because of the infeasibility of distributing the proceeds of the settlement
(or of the judgment, in the rare case in which a class action not dismissed pretrial goes to trial rather than being settled) to the class mem-

76. Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750 (7th Cir. 2014).
77. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
2012).
78. Chapman v. Wagener Equities, Inc., 747 F.3d 489 (7th Cir. 2014) (certifying a class of
junk fax recipients in an action brought under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. §
227(b)(1)(C), for statutory damages).
79. Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 2014) (an opinion rejecting defendants’
“numerosity” challenge, but reversing class certification for plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy
predominance in a benzene exposure case).
80. Driver v. AppleIllinois, LLC, 739 F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 2014) (denying Rule 23(f) petition
from denial of motion to decertify class).
81. Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1083 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing denial
of class certification in Fair Debt Collection Practices case, articulating a practical standard for
adequacy, and reaffirming that “proof of injury is not required when the only damages sought are
statutory”).
82. Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing
decertification order).
83. Pearson v. NBTY, 772 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing class settlement).
84. Redman v. Radioshack Corp., 768 F.3d 622 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub nom. Nicaj
v. Shoe Carnival, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1429 (2015) (reversing “coupon” class settlement).
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85

For contrast, see Chief Justice Roberts’ unusual dissent from the denial
of certiorari in Marek v. Lane,86 discussed below,87 targeting cy pres for
future Supreme Court scrutiny.
The Seventh Circuit’s contemporary jurisprudence continues to
emphasize the clarifying role of the Supreme Court’s common
question/common answer insight in Wal-Mart, and the proper meaning
of post-Comcast predominance. An example of this integration of
Roberts Court holdings into the enduring Rule 23 infrastructure is found
in a consumer class action “about coffee.” Not just any coffee–but cheap
instant coffee deceptively portrayed and promoted as a competitor of the
popular, and premium-priced, “K-cup” coffee.88
As the Seventh Circuit discerned in Suchanek, the district court, in
denying class certification, erred when it “failed to recognize the
question common to the claims of all putative class members: whether
[the product’s] packaging was likely to mislead a reasonable
consumer.”89 In the consumer context, where “the same conduct or
practice by the same defendant gives rise to the same kind of claim from
all class members, there is a common question.”90
The second error requiring reversal of the denial of certification
was the district court’s misreading of Comcast. The district court took
predominance too far. “Neither Rule 23 nor any gloss that decided cases
have added to it requires that every question be common.”91 The
damages themselves, for example, may vary, and “it is routine in class
actions to have a final phase in which individualized proof must be
submitted.”92

85. Hughes, 731 F.3d at 676.
86. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
87. See infra Part VII.
88. Suchanek v. Sturm Foods, Inc., 764 F.3d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 2014).
89. Id. at 755 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) and POM
Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014) (a Lanham Act case regarding
misleading packaging)).
90. Id. at 756 (citing Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 394 (7th Cir. 2010); In re IKO
Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 601-02 (7th Cir. 2014); and Butler v. Sears
Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 798 (7th Cir. 2013)).
91. Id. at 756 (emphasis in original).
92. Id. (citing Judge Easterbrook’s decision in IKO Roofing, reiterating the Comcast rule:
theories of damages must match theories of liability, but predominance does not depend on common
damages, and damages may be determined by individualized proof).
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Whirlpool and Butler: Moldy Washers As the Champions of Timeof-Purchase Consumer Injury

What Happened to the Washers? The class certification decisions of
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in the “moldy washer” cases, In re
Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig.93 and Butler
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,94 spent a year in the Supreme Court on “GVR”
(Grant-Vacate-Remand) and were then sent back to their respective
circuits for further consideration in light of Comcast.95 After
reconsidering the matter in light of Comcast, the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the order of the district court certifying a liability class.96 Similarly, on
remand from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit reconsidered its
prior ruling in light of Comcast and denied the defendant’s quest for
further remand to the district court, “for a fresh ruling on certification in
light of Comcast,” while the plaintiffs requested the court to reinstate its
prior judgment, granting class certification.97 The Seventh Circuit
reaffirmed its earlier grant of class certification.98
In a nutshell, both “moldy washer” cases involved Whirlpoolmanufactured front-loading washing machines (branded as “Kenmore”
when sold by Sears) that allegedly were designed in such a way that they
trapped mold and did not adequately self-clean. As a result, consumers
were required to undertake expensive and extraordinary maintenance to
ameliorate the development of mold and resulting noxious odors: a
situation undisclosed by the defendants at the time of sale. As
summarized in the plaintiffs’ initial brief in opposition to the second
round (post-Comcast) of certiorari petitions, the plaintiffs summarized a
problem revealed in pre-certification discovery as follows:
Whirlpool’s own engineers have conceded that the FLWs [frontloading washing machines] are the “ideal environment for bacteria and
mold to flourish” because of their “lower water levels, high moisture,
and reduced ventilation.” Whirlpool, moreover, concluded that odor, a
common end result of mold contamination, had developed in 35% of
the FLWs within just a few years, and estimated that 50% of “current
front-load washer owners might be looking for a solution to an odor

93. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 678 F.3d 409 (6th Cir.
2012).
94. Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 702 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2012).
95. See Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer, 133 S. Ct. 1722 (2013).
96. See In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 845
(6th Cir. 2013).
97. See Butler v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 727 F.3d 796, 798 (7th Cir. 2013).
98. Id. at 802.
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problem with their machines.”
While Sears and Whirlpool denied warranty coverage for this problem,
Whirlpool developed and sells a product to all purchasers of the FLWs
that it touts as addressing the problem. Sears and Whirlpool, moreover,
eventually instructed all purchasers to follow elaborate procedures to
forestall the mold problem, including running extra cycles with bleach,
wiping and cleaning the machine after each use, and leaving the wash99
er door open at all times.

In Butler, on remand from the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit
reiterated its previous holding that it was the district court that had erred,
by failing to conduct a rigorous class certification analysis of the claims,
and reiterated its reversal of the district court’s denial of mold class
certification. In applying the Comcast decision to the facts as developed
in the case, and to the claims asserted, Judge Posner summarized the
holding of Comcast as follows:
Comcast holds that a damages suit cannot be certified to proceed as a
class action unless the damages sought are the result of the class-wide
injury that the suit alleges. Comcast was an antitrust suit, and the Court
said that “if [the plaintiffs] prevail on their claims, they would be entitled only to damages resulting from reduced overbuilder competition,
since that is the only theory of antitrust impact accepted for classaction treatment by the District Court. It follows that a model purporting to serve as evidence of damages in this class action must measure
only those damages attributable to that theory. If the model does not
even attempt to do that, it cannot possibly establish that damages are
susceptible of measurement across the entire class for purposes of Rule
23(b)(3).” “[A] methodology that identifies damages that are not the
result of the wrong” is an impermissible basis for calculating classwide damages. “For all we know, cable subscribers in Gloucester
County may have been overcharged because of petitioners’ alleged
elimination of satellite competition (a theory of liability that is not capable of classwide proof).” And on the next page of its opinion the
Court quotes approvingly from Federal Judicial Center, Reference
Manual on Scientific Evidence 432 (3d ed. 2011), that “the first step in
a damages study is the translation of the legal theory of the harmful
event into an analysis of the economic impact of that event.” None of
the parties had even challenged the district court’s ruling that class certification required “that the damages resulting from . . . [the antitrust
violation] were measurable ‘on a class-wide basis’ through use of a

99. Respondents’ Brief in Opposition, Butler, 727 F.3d 796 (No. 12-1067), 2013 WL
1836534, at *4-5 (internal citations omitted).
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100

The situation in Comcast was then contrasted to the claims presented in
Butler:
Unlike the situation in Comcast, there is no possibility in this case that
damages could be attributed to acts of the defendants that are not challenged on a class-wide basis; all members of the mold class attribute
their damages to mold and all members of the control-unit class to a
defect in the control unit.

...
Sears compares the design changes that may have affected the severity
of the mold problem to the different antitrust liability theories in Comcast. But it was not the existence of multiple theories in that case that
precluded class certification; it was the plaintiffs’ failure to base all the
damages they sought on the antitrust impact—the injury—of which the
plaintiffs were complaining. In contrast, any buyer of a Kenmore
washing machine who experienced a mold problem was harmed by a
breach of warranty alleged in the complaint.
Furthermore and fundamentally, the district court in our case, unlike
Comcast, neither was asked to decide nor did decide whether to deter101
mine the damages on a class-wide basis.

Butler, consistent with the Seventh Circuit’s earlier, post-Wal-Mart
decision in McReynolds,102explained that when the class action is
“limited to determining liability on a class-wide basis, [] separate
hearings to determine—if liability is established—the damages of
individual class members, or homogenous groups of class members, is
permitted by Rule 23(c)(4) and will often be the sensible way to
proceed.”103
In Butler, the Seventh Circuit further takes the opportunity to
emphasize a key holding of Wal-Mart: that an “issue ‘central to the
validity of each one of the claims’ in a class action, if it can be resolved

100. Butler, 727 F.3d at 799 (internal citations omitted).
101. Id. at 800 (internal citations omitted).
102. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482 (7th Cir.
2012).
103. Butler, 727 F.3d at 800. Rule 23(c)(4) has an established history in the Seventh Circuit as
a practical, efficient, and rule-based mechanism to sort common questions from individual ones; the
former are provided class treatment, while the latter are reserved for individual determination. See,
e.g., Pella Corp. v. Saltzman, 606 F.3d 391, 393-94 (7th Cir. 2010) (per curiam); McReynolds, 672
F.3d 482, cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 338 (2012); Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076
(7th Cir. 2013).
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‘in one stroke’ can justify class treatment.”104 Butler recognizes that
Wal-Mart was speaking of Rule 23(a)(2) commonality (although, as this
Article notes, it borrowed from Nagareda’s predominance articulation to
do so). But Butler goes on to observe that “predominance requires a
qualitative assessment too; it is not bean counting.”105 Moreover, as
Butler notes, damages is not one of those questions that must be placed
on the “common” side of the ledger in order for predominance to be met.
To do so would render Rule 23 dysfunctional:
It would drive a stake through the heart of the class action device, in
cases in which damages were sought rather than an injunction or a declaratory judgment, to require that every member of the class have
identical damages. If the issues of liability are genuinely common issues, and the damages of individual class members can be readily determined in individual hearings, in settlement negotiations, or by creation of subclasses, the fact that damages are not identical across all
class members should not preclude class certification. Otherwise defendants would be able to escape liability for tortious harms of enormous aggregate magnitude but so widely distributed as not to be remediable in individual suits. As we noted in Carnegie v. Household Int’l,
Inc., “the more claimants there are, the more likely a class action is to
yield substantial economies in litigation. It would hardly be an improvement to have in lieu of this single class 17 million suits each
seeking damages of $15 to $30 . . . . The realistic alternative to a class
action is not individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic
or a fanatic sues for $30.” The present case is less extreme: tens of
thousands of class members, each seeking damages of a few hundred
dollars. But few members of such a class, considering the costs and
distraction of litigation, would think so meager a prospect made suing
106
worthwhile.

The Butler decision, on remand, reaffirmed a single, central,
unifying, and predominating common question, which it described as
follows:
There is a single, central, common issue of liability: whether the Sears
washing machine was defective. Two separate defects are alleged, but
remember that this class action is really two class actions. In one the
defect alleged involves mold, in the other the control unit. Each defect
104. Butler, 727 F.3d at 801 (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551
(2011)).
105. Id. at 801 (citing Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 (2013);
Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997); and its own Messner v. Northshore
Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 819 (7th Cir. 2012)).
106. Id. (citing Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
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is central to liability. Complications arise from the design changes and
from separate state warranty laws, but can be handled by the creation
of subclasses. These are matters for the district judge to consider in the
first instance, and Sears will be able to present to her the evidence it’s
obtained since the district judge ruled on certification almost two years
107
ago.

On its post-Comcast remand, the Sixth Circuit also reaffirmed
Whirlpool’s class treatment, in a decision dissimilar in style, but not in
substance, to that in Butler. Addressing the meaning of a Supreme Court
GVR order, the Whirlpool decision observed that such is not equivalent
to reversal on the merits, nor is it an “invitation to reverse”; rather, it
directs a simple determination of whether the original decision to affirm
the class certification order was correct or “whether Comcast Corp.
compels a different resolution.”108
Reviewing the facts developed in the case again, including
Whirlpool’s clever transformation of a warranty liability to a profit
center (the development and sale of “Affresh” tablets to their customers
to battle the mold problem), the court had no difficulty in determining
common questions of defect, nondisclosure, breach of warranty, and
economic harm.109 The Whirlpool court applied both Comcast and
Amgen to its re-analysis, addressing Amgen as follows:
Following Amgen’s lead, we uphold the district court’s determination
that liability questions common to the Ohio class—whether the alleged
design defects in the Duets proximately caused mold to grow in the
machines and whether Whirlpool adequately warned consumers about
the propensity for mold growth—predominate over any individual
questions. As in Amgen, the certified liability class “will prevail or fail
in unison,” for all of the same reasons we discussed above in conjunction with the Rule 23(a) prerequisites of commonality and typicality.
Rule 23(b)(3) does not mandate that a plaintiff seeking class certification prove that each element of the claim is susceptible to classwide
proof. Evidence will either prove or disprove as to all class members
whether the alleged design defects caused the collection of biofilm,
promoting mold growth, and whether Whirlpool failed to warn con110
sumers adequately of the propensity for mold growth in the Duets.

107. Id. at 801-02 (citing Johnson v. Meriter Health Servs. Emp. Ret. Plan, 702 F.3d 364, 365
(7th Cir. 2012)).
108. In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Prods. Liab. Litig., 722 F.3d 838, 845 (6th
Cir. 2013).
109. Id. at 848-49.
110. Id. at 859 (quoting and citing Amgen, 133 S. Ct. at 1191, 1196).
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Turning to an analysis of Comcast, and a comparison of the
Comcast claims and facts with those presented by the washer litigation,
the Whirlpool court concluded:
This case is different from Comcast Corp. Here the district court certified only a liability class and reserved all issues concerning damages
for individual determination; in Comcast Corp. the court certified a
class to determine both liability and damages. Where determinations
on liability and damages have been bifurcated, see Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(c)(4), the decision in Comcast—to reject certification of a liability
and damages class because plaintiffs failed to establish that damages
could be measured on a classwide basis—has limited application. To
the extent that Comcast Corp. reaffirms the settled rule that liability issues relating to injury must be susceptible of proof on a classwide basis to meet the predominance standard, our opinion thoroughly demon111
strates why that requirement is met in this case.

The Whirlpool decision also considered the overall impact of both
Amgen and Comcast on Rule 23 class certification criteria. It noted that
both cases “are premised on existing class-action jurisprudence. The
majority in Comcast concludes that the case ‘turns on the
straightforward application of class certification principles,’ and the
dissent concurs that ‘the opinion breaks no new ground on the standard
for certifying a class action . . .’”112 Whirlpool thus concluded that “in
‘the mine run’ of cases it remains the ‘black letter rule’ that a class may
obtain certification under Rule 23(b)(3) when liability questions
common to the class predominate over damages questions unique to
class members.”113
As to the sequence and methodology for adjudication of common
and individual questions, Whirlpool is succinct:
Once the district court resolves under Ohio law the common liability
questions that are likely to generate common answers in this case, the
court will either enter judgment for Whirlpool or proceed to the question of plaintiffs’ damages. In the latter event, the court may exercise
its discretion in line with Amgen, Comcast Corp., and other cases cited
114
in this opinion to resolve the damages issues.

As it turned out, the jury rendered a defense verdict in the Whirlpool trial
111. Id. at 860 (citing Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013))
(“observing after Comcast that class ‘must be able to show that their damages stemmed from the
defendant’s actions that created the legal liability’”).
112. Id. at 861 (quoting Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1433, 1436 (2013)).
113. Id. at 860-61.
114. Id.
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on October 30, 2014.115 At the time of this writing, an appeal is
underway. The Whirlpool experience, including the trial, demonstrates
that class actions are not theoretical. Properly designed, they serve their
intended precise function at trial as well as in settlement. Legal
commentary in the immediate wake of the Whirlpool verdict confirmed
the trial as an example of class action efficacy.116
In the washer cases, did both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits defy
Comcast in reconsidering, and reaffirming, their previous class
certification decisions? The defendants certainly thought so and
promptly filed petitions for certiorari in both actions, sending the “moldy
washer” cases on a return trip (a second rinse cycle, if you will) back to
the Supreme Court. Surprisingly or not, certiorari was denied in both
actions.117 The Butler case is proceeding toward trial in their respective
district courts at this writing. Comcast, thus, did not cast its shadow
across these consumer warranty cases. The simplest explanation is that
the holding and rationale of Comcast simply did not reach them. Neither
washer case sought an aggregate classwide damages amount. Rather,
class certification in each was sought for the preclusive determination of
liability-related common questions only.
VI. IMPRECATIONS ON AN IMPLICATION: COURTS THWART THE
ATTEMPTED MERGER OF THE “ASCERTAINABILITY” REQUIREMENT AND
THE MERITS-QUALIFIED CLASS
To assure that class action notices fulfill their due process functions
of informing recipients as to whether they were within the class, and
thus to assure the class judgments would have their intended preclusive
affect, courts began to impose an implicit pre-condition to class
certification, holding that “the identity of class members must be

115. Gibson Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 2014 Year-End Update on Class Actions, GIBSON DUNN
(Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/pages/2014-Year-End-Update—ClassActions.aspx.
116. See, e.g., Alison Frankel, Why Whirlpool’s Win in Moldy Washer Trial Vindicates
Consumer Class Actions, REUTERS (Oct. 30, 2014), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2014/10/30/why-whirlpools-win-in-moldy-washer-trial-vindicates-consumer-class-actions/;
Paul Karlsgodt, Why Whirlpool’s Class Action Trial Victory May Be Bad News For Class Action
Defendants, CLASS ACTION BLAWG (Oct. 31, 2014); http://classactionblawg.com/category/rule-23/;
Melody Akhavan, Despite Whirlpool’s Victory At Trial, Earlier Order Denying Decertification
Raises Questions About Dukes/Comcast Impact, PROD. LIAB. MONITOR (Oct. 31, 2014),
http://product-liability.weil.com/class-action-law-suits/despite-whirlpools-victory-at-trial-earlierorder-denying-decertification-raises-questions-about-dukescomcast-impact/.
117. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Butler, 134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014); Whirlpool Corp. v. Glazer,
134 S. Ct. 1277 (2014).
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reasonably ascertainable by reference to objective criteria.”118 In its
usual articulation, this “ascertainability” requirement means that “the
class description is sufficiently definite so that it is administratively
feasible for the court to determine whether a particular individual is a
member.”119 The rationale is described in the Federal Judicial Center’s
Manual for Complex Litigation Fourth, as follows:
21.222. Definition of Class.
Defining the class is of critical importance because it identifies the persons (1) entitled to relief, (2) bound by a final judgment, and (3) entitled under Rule 23(c)(2) to the “best notice practicable” in a Rule
23(b)(3) action. The definition must be precise, objective, and presently ascertainable. For example, the class may consist of those persons
and companies that purchased specified products or securities from the
defendants during a specified period, or it may consist of all persons
who sought employment or who were employed by the defendant during a fixed period.
Although the identity of individual class members need not be ascertained before class certification, the membership of the class must be
ascertainable. Because individual class members must receive the best
notice practicable and have an opportunity to opt out, and because individual damage claims are likely, Rule 23(b)(3) actions require a class
definition that will permit identification of individual class members,
while Rule 23(b)(l) or (b)(2) actions may not. An identifiable class exists if its members can be ascertained by reference to objective criteria.
The order defining the class should avoid subjective standards (e.g., a
plaintiff’s state of mind) or terms that depend on resolution of the mer120
its (e.g., persons who were discriminated against) . . . .

As noted above, defendants now frequently contend that class
118. Ebin v. Cangadis Food, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 561, 566-67 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). The engrafting of
ascertainability onto Rule 23(a) has early roots. As stated in DeBremaecker v. Short, “It is
elementary that in order to maintain a class action, the class sought to be represented must be
adequately defined and clearly ascertainable.” DeBremaecker v. Short, 433 F.2d 733, 734 (5th Cir.
1970).
119. See, e.g., Ebin, 297 F.R.D. at 567; see NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 19, §
3:1.
120. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, 2 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION 270 (4th ed. 2004). A
recent decision affirming certification of a settlement class excused a class definition that included
common stock investors who bought defendant’s stock “and were damaged thereby,” rejecting the
attacks, by settlement objectors, on the definition as “not precise, objective or presently
ascertainable.” Union Asset Mgm’t v. Dell, 669 F.3d 632, 639 (5th Cir. 2012). The “damaged”
language was “superfluous,” merely conveying a basic standing requirement—an allegation of
damage; and one which, however, was resolved in the settlement, with claims paid based on trading
records, rather than merits minitrials. Id.
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certification is improper because the class includes members who were
not injured by the conduct or product at issue. This challenge includes
several lines of attack. Defendants may contend that the presence of any
uninjured class members (even a minuscule number) defeats Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement because the existence of any
uninjured class members precludes the use of common proof at trial.
This attack is most frequently seen in antitrust cases where, unlike other
substantive areas of law, liability and damages merge, at least partially,
in the element of classwide impact of the anticompetitive conduct.
Hence the Comcast holding that the damages methodology upon which
class certification is based—and upon which classwide proof at trial will
depend—must match the actual claim or theory on which class
certification is sought and granted. As articulated, most recently, by the
First Circuit in In re Nexium Antitrust Litigation:121
Relevant to the question of whether a class can include uninjured
members, three principles are established. First, a class action is improper unless the theory of liability is limited to the injury caused by
the defendants. In other words the defendants cannot be held liable for
damages beyond the injury they caused. The Supreme Court empha122
sized this principle in Comcast.

The Nexium decision builds upon other circuits’ applications of
Comcast, including Deepwater, Butler, the Ninth Circuit’s Leyva v.
Medline Industries, Inc. decision, and the Tenth Circuit’s In re Urethane
Antitrust Litigation decision.123
121. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2015).
122. Id. at 18. As Nexium explains, the Comcast plaintiffs had initially relied on four theories
of liability and had calculated their aggregate damages based on all four. When the district court
certified the class based on only one theory, and plaintiffs did not provide a damages calculation for
that theory standing alone, they failed to establish that “‘damages are capable of measurement on a
classwide basis’” and hence flunked Rule 23(b)(3) predominance. Id. (quoting Comcast Corp. v.
Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1434 (2013)). In affirming class certification in the case before it, the
Nexium court found the plaintiffs’ theory of liability to be appropriately limited to the damages
addressed in their expert methodology.
123. Id. at *17-18 n.15.
Other circuits have also adopted this understanding of Comcast. See In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1258-59 (10th Cir. 2014) (explaining the expert’s benchmarks in Comcast became ‘useless’ upon a ruling that three of the liability theories could
not be used); In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790, 815 (5th Cir. 2014), (explaining
that Comcast stands for the proposition that formulas for classwide measurement of
damages should not be ‘incompatible’ with liability theories); Butler v. Sears, 727 F.3d
796, 799 (7th Cir. 2013) (A damages model must ‘measure only those damages attributable to [the liability] theory. If the model does not even attempt to do that, it cannot’
meet the requirements of Rule 23(b)(3), (citing Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433)), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1277, 188 L. Ed. 2d 298 (2014); Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d
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The second principle identified in Nexium as relevant to whether a
class may include uninjured members is the implied class certification
prerequisite of “definiteness” or “ascertainability.” As Nexium explains,
“second, the definition of the class must be ‘definite,’ that is, the
standards must allow the class members to be ascertainable.”124 Nexium
also cites the Third Circuit’s decision in Carrera v. Bayer Corp.,125
which required as an “essential prerequisite of a class action” that
plaintiffs “show, by a preponderance of the evidence, the class is
currently and readily ascertainable based on objective criteria.”126 Note
that although Carrera uses the term “readily ascertainable,” this is not
itself a departure from the standard formulation of ascertainability,
which relies upon an objective definition of the class to enable
identification of its members at a later time, typically after the
determination of liability questions or at the notice or claim stage of a
class action settlement when the purpose of identifying the members is
to assure their meaningful participation in a claims process. “Readily
ascertainable” does not, or should not, mean “immediately identifiable.”
The Carrera court, unlike the Nexium majority, was skeptical of the
proposed affidavit-based claims process; by contrast, the Seventh Circuit
has endorsed and recommended such streamlined procedures for small
claims settlements.127 The Nexium decision itself holds to the standard
view: that the class certification satisfies these standards “by being
defined in terms of purchasers of Nexium during the class
period . . . .”128
510, 514 (9th Cir. 2013) (‘[P]laintiffs must be able to show that their damages stemmed
from the defendant’s actions that created the legal liability.’) (citing Comcast, 133 S. Ct.
at 1435)).
124. See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 19, §§ 3:1, 3:3 (explaining that an
“implied” requirement for certification is that a “putative class [is] ascertainable with reference to
objective criteria’”).
125. Carrera v. Bayer Corp., 727 F.3d 300, 306 (3d Cir. 2013), reh’g and reh’g. en banc
denied, No. 12 -2621, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 1553 (3d Cir. May 2, 2014).
126. Id. An earlier Third Circuit decision declared ascertainability “an essential prerequisite of
a class action, at least with respect to class actions under Rule 23(b)(3).” Marcus v. BMW of N.
Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592-93 (3d Cir. 2012).
127. Compare Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307-08 (rejecting plaintiff’s proposal to allow proof-ofpurchase by affidavit in the adversary context of a trial-purposes class), with Pearson v. NBTY, Inc.,
772 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 2014) (rejecting a class settlement in which the settling parties proposed
a disproportionately onerous claims process; as the court saw it, simple sworn statements—or the
distribution of no questions asked checks, were better for the class, but defendant “was trying to
minimize the number of claims” and “probably all that class counsel really care about is their
fees.”).
128. In re Nexium Antitrust Litig., 777 F.3d 9, 19 (1st Cir. 2015). Note also that the Third
Circuit itself has subsequently clarified Carrera in Byrd v. Aaron’s, Inc., 784 F.3d 154 (3d Cir.
2015). The Byrd exegesis of ascertainability reaffirms that there is no requirement to identify class
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The third principle identified in Nexium is that “where an individual
claims process is conducted at the liability and damages stage of the
litigation, the payout of the amount for which the defendants were held
liable must be limited to injured parties.”129 As the Nexium court
clarifies, at the class certification stage “the court must be satisfied that,
prior to judgment, it will be possible to establish a mechanism for
distinguishing the injured from the uninjured class members. The court
may proceed with certification so long as this mechanism will be
‘administratively feasible,’” a proposition with which Carrera agrees.130
Notably, the Nexium court does not apply this principle to situations
“where the distribution of the recovery is not based on an individual
claims process: for example, where the amount of recovery for each
individual class member is so small that it is not practical to engage in an
individual claims process.”131 In such circumstances, the Nexium court
acknowledges the propriety of cy pres.132
In Nexium, the defendants argued that there were uninjured
members within the class; that is, brand-loyal Nexium customers who
would continue to buy the drug even if lower-priced generics became
available. The Nexium class claimed that the manufacturer of Nexium
and would-be manufacturers of competing generics had agreed instead
to delay the entry of these generics into the market, thus creating an
anticompetitive situation in which consumers continued to pay higher
prescription prices for Nexium because there were no generic
alternatives. The defendants essentially argued that there were brand
loyalists in that bunch, that these Nexium-at-any-cost loyalists could not
be identified at the time of class certification (although they existed),
and, moreover, that any mechanism that was conducted, postcertification, to determine their existence through individualized claim
procedures was improper in light of Comcast.
The Nexium court examined and rejected each of these arguments
in turn, holding to the well-established principle, reaffirmed by the
Roberts Court in its Amgen decision, that the need for some
members at the certification stage and that a class definition need not include all potentially injured
persons, or only injured persons, to be ascertainable. Id. at 170. Under Byrd, the traditional tenets of
ascertainability remain: (1) a class defined with reference to objective criteria; and (2) a reliable and
administratively feasible mechanism to determine (post-liability or in settlement) whether putative
class members fall within the class definition. Id. (citing Hayes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 725 F.3d
349, 355 (3d Cir. 2013)).
129. Nexium, 777 F.3d at 19.
130. Id. (citing Carrera, 727 F.3d at 307).
131. Id. at 19 n.16.
132. Id.
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individualized determinations at both the liability and damages stages
does not defeat class certification because Rule 23(b)(3) “does not
require a plaintiff seeking class certification to prove that each element
of her claim is susceptible to classwide proof.”133 Rather, the question is
whether there is “reason to think that [individualized] questions will
overwhelm common ones and render class certification
inappropriate . . . .”134 In short, the black letter rule, that “individual
damage calculations generally do not defeat a finding that common
issues predominate,” is alive and well.135 Having identified these three
principles or requirements—(1) ensuring the class is definite; (2)
limiting aggregate recovery to the amount of the injury; and (3) ensuring
recovery by only injured parties—the Nexium decision states, “it is
difficult to understand why the presence of uninjured class members at
the preliminary stage should defeat class certification.”136 After all, the
defendant ultimately will not pay, and the class members will not
recover, amounts attributable to uninjured class members because
judgment will not be entered in favor of such members.
While some number of uninjured class members will receive a class
notice, and while such a notice is in some respects like the promotion
that trumpets “you may already be a winner,” no class member actually
wins a share of the recovery unless she proves damages in the manner
specified by the court as appropriate. The proof may be simple (an
attestation of fact), or it may, depending upon the amount involved and
the complexity of the case, be a more demanding process including
documentation of investment, proof of purchase, or other records. Courts
possess the authority and discretion to tailor the proof to the nature and
amount at stake, as the Seventh Circuit has recently and abundantly
made clear in its Hughes and Pearson decisions.137 As Nexium observes,
“at worst the inclusion of some uninjured class members is inefficient,
but this is counterbalanced by the overall efficiency of the class action
mechanism. Moreover, excluding all uninjured members at the
certification stage is almost impossible in many cases, given the
inappropriateness of certifying what is known as a single ‘fail-safe
class’—class defined in terms of the legal injury.”138
133. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1196 (2013).
134. Nexium, 777 F.3d at 23 (quoting Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2398, 2412 (2014)).
135. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 19, §4:54.
136. Nexium, 777 F.3d at 21.
137. Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enter., Inc., 731 F.3d 672, 675-76 (7th Cir. 2013); Pearson v.
NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 2014).
138. Nexium, 777 F.3d at 22.
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What is a fail-safe class? In the earlier decades of class
certification, class definitions were often ambiguous, couched in
subjective terms such as “all those injured by defendant’s conduct.” A
fail-safe class is one in which it is virtually impossible for a defendant to
ever win the case, with the intended class preclusive effects, because it
would allow putative class members to seek a remedy but not be bound
by an adverse judgment: if the class members win, they are in the class;
if they lose, they are not in the class, are not bound, and can engage in
subsequent litigation.139
Newberg on Class Actions describes a number of problems with
merits-dependent class definitions, sometimes called “fail-safe classes,”
primarily because they flunk the definiteness/ascertainability request.140
Defendants who make both arguments—and increasingly many do—that
the class is not ascertainable and that it must only include “injured”
members—are advancing internally inconsistent positions strategically
aimed toward a vanishing point: no class can exist. The fail-safe class is
often viewed as a “heads I win, tails you lose” prospect. Such classes
may “‘allow putative class members to seek a remedy but not be bound
by an adverse judgment,’” a scenario that fails “‘to provide the final
resolution of the claims of all class members that is envisioned in class
action litigation.’”141
Courts sometimes struggle to achieve the perfect balance between
minimizing the number of potentially uninjured members in the class
definition and including all injured parties. As Judge Posner observed,
“defining a class so as to avoid, on one hand, being over-inclusive and,
on the other hand, the failsafe problem is more of an art than a
science.”142 To make the problem even more severe, attempting to
entirely separate the injured from the uninjured at the class certification
stage constitutes a leap ahead to the ultimate merits of the individual
class members’ claims: it accelerates these individual questions ahead of
the common liability questions for which class certification is designed.
139. Id. at 22 n.19.
140. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 19, § 2:6. As defined in Rodriguez, “a fail-safe
class is a class whose membership can only be ascertained by a determination of the merits of the
case because the class is defined in terms of the ultimate question of liability.” In re Rodriguez, 695
F.3d 360, 369 (5th Cir. 2012). Most circuits have criticized, or categorically rejected, fail-safe
classes. See NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 19, § 3:6.
141. NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 19, § 3:6 (quoting Young v. Nationwide Mut.
Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 2012)).
142. Messner v. Northshore Univ. HealthSystem, 669 F.3d 802, 825 (7th Cir. 2012) (vacating
class certification denial despite presence of potentially uninjured class members). See also In re
Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d 1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming class certification despite
the fact that some of the plaintiffs avoided injury altogether).
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It frustrates all of the efficiencies and economies class actions are
intended to deliver, and even worse, it is that very thing the Roberts
Court continues to caution courts to avoid. As the Supreme Court
lectured in Amgen, “Rule 23 grants courts no license to engage in freeranging merits inquiries at the certification stage.”143
Because the Roberts Court has not changed the fundamental rule
that the damages phase of a class action may present individualized
issues and require individualized proofs, without defeating Rule 23(b)(3)
predominance (which may be satisfied by significant common questions
relating to liability), and because a fundamental purpose of class actions
remains preclusive, the added expense and delay involved in pre-proving
damages in order to rid a proposed class of any possibly “uninjured”
members would so burden the class action mechanism that it could not
serve what the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized as its core
purpose: “vindication of the rights of groups of people who individually
would be without effective strength to bring their opponents to court at
all.”144
The Nexium decision echoes the proportionality and practicality
principles articulated in 21st century Seventh Circuit decisions, and
earlier decisions of the First Circuit itself.145 Nexium exposes the
disproportionality of a defense argument, in an antitrust, consumer, or
similar economic loss class action, where the defendant posits the
existence of contrarians or “loyalists” within the class who run counter
to the majority. Where, as in the publicly traded securities and antitrust
contexts, for example, it is markets that matter, and tests such as reliance
depend upon objective, reasonable person standards, such forays are not
only disproportionate to the individual stakes involved, but contrary to
common sense. In Nexium, for example, paying an overcharge caused by
the alleged anticompetitive conduct on even a single purchase would
suffice to show, as a legal and factual matter, impact or fact of
damage.146 That an “atypical” purchaser might be happy to do so, or
unmotivated to seek individual redress and reimbursement, is
143. Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans &Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1194-95 (2013).
144. Nexium, 777 F.3d at 22 (quoting Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617
(1997)) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note).
145. Nexium cites, inter alia, Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir.
2004) (“The realistic alternative to a class action is not seventeen million individual suits, but zero
individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”); and In re New Motor Vehicles Can.
Exp. Antitrust Litig., 522 F.3d 6, 8 (1st. Cir. 2008) (“An erroneous failure to certify a class where
individual claims are small may deprive plaintiffs of the only realistic mechanism to vindicate
meritorious claims.”).
146. Nexium, 777 F.3d at 27.
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irrelevant.147
As preeminent commentators—deeply implicated in the creation of
modern-day Rule 23 and deeply invested in the continuing utility of the
class form in promoting judicial economy, access to courts, and citizen
confidence in the rule of law—remind us, economic reality has long
since moved on from individualized transactions.148 Sellers of goods and
services market generally and categorically. They may target specific
demographics (age groups, social class, urban v. rural, and even race),
but the law of big numbers works in their favor on the sales and
marketing side. Their messages are calculated to generate “buy”
responses by the many.149 By contrast, when defending against those
who come at them in big numbers when a product goes awry or a trusted
service cheats, these same entities, as defendants, focus on the few, the
anomalies, to defeat class certification. Their thought is, “not everyone
can have been fooled by our lies; someone must have seen through our
scheme; there are folks in the class who really didn’t expect our product
to perform. Either a class cannot exist because they are in it, or they
must be expelled prior to certification.” Such arguments, although
advanced in the guise of ascertainability, or even standing, impose upon
the class a different (and now non-exempt) social and economic reality
than the operative one in which defendant has actually conducted its
business. Some commentators have urged courts to see through this
double-standard, and some courts have in fact seen through it.150
The persistent attack that a class may not include the uninjured not
only attempts to conflate Article III standing—which is properly based
upon allegations at the pre-trial (including class certification) stages,
rather than ultimate proof on the merits—it also misapprehends, or

147. Id. at 28.
148. See Miller, supra note 15, at 313 (“Let’s be realistic: the era of disputes over customcrafted oxcarts and the like is over. Significant products are mass produced and sold on a national or
global marketplace basis, and a multitude of transactions take place, often anonymously, on the
internet, manufacturers, financial institutions, and service providers benefit from these
geographically unbounded marketplaces, distribution systems, and information networks.”).
149. See, for example, the description of defendant’s mass marketing strategies and research
in Suchanek v. Strum Foods, 764 F.3d 750, 752-55 (7th Cir. 2014) (vacating denial of class
certification and reversing summary judgment in an eight-state consumer class action).
150. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class
Actions, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1633 (2000); Miller, supra note 15, at 313 (“Because these entities reap
the rewards of national or global commerce, plaintiffs similarly should be entitled to seek
rectification on a correspondingly . . . aggregate basis when there is a commonality of claims.
Recognition of the characteristics of today’s commercial world and the valve of efficient dispute
resolution might motivate courts to allow the aggregate litigation pendulum to retrace its arc.”);
Nexium, 777 F.3d at 29-30 (debating the “brand loyalist” argument).
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misrepresents, the nature of many antitrust and consumer claims. For
example, “antitrust injury occurs the moment the purchaser incurs an
overcharge, whether or not that injury is later offset.”151 In consumer
claims based upon breach of warranty or violation of consumer
protection statutes (as in the Whirlpool cases, for example) injury
occurred at the time of the sale.
When a consumer purchases a product for service whose qualities,
common nature, and characteristics have been misrepresented or whose
faults (such as a design flaw that might manifest in damage or injury
years later) are concealed, awaiting manifestation of a defect not only
frustrates the class certification process, but is incompatible with the
substantive theories of liability and damages in the case. Defendants
keep arguing that every defect must manifest before a consumer or
warranty claim may be stated, or certified, and they do so because courts
continue in some confusion on this point as well. The Whirlpool and
Butler courts had no such difficulty, and the survival of these decisions,
after two cycles of Supreme Court review, demonstrates that the
Supreme Court does not share such confusion.152
Courts have found that the standard of ascertainability is “‘not
demanding,’” being “‘designed only to prevent the certification of a
class whose membership is truly indeterminable.’”153 Nonetheless,

151. Nexium, 777 F.3d at 27 (citing Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397, 407 (1932)).
152. A very recent column by “The Ethicist” in the New York Times magazine illustrates, in
pellucid lay person’s terms, the concept of consumer injury at the point of sale in the following
question and answer exchange:
[Q] I received an unsolicited check in the mail. The accompanying notice explained that
it was my part of a class-action settlement relating to a latent defect in the automobiles
made by my car’s manufacturer. I have never had any issues with my car; it has been reliable and has performed well. I consider it to be worth the money I paid for it. Can I
cash the check? JOHN ANDERSON, SANTA FE, N.M.
[A] The class-action settlement represents an automaker’s concession that its product is
defective. Because this defect doesn’t affect you, it seems as though you’re getting
something for nothing. But you didn’t angle for this money in any way; the car company
simply acknowledged—or was compelled to acknowledge—that the vehicles it sold had
an inherent weakness. The fact that the deficiency didn’t affect you doesn’t mean that it
won’t come into play later, or that you did not unknowingly take on the risk of driving a
car that did not perform to the company’s own standard.
Chuck Klosterman, Two Cents, Too Late, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Jan. 23, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/25/magazine/two-cents-too-late.html?_r=0. Imagine if this
transaction happened at the time of purchase. While you’re buying the car, the dealer says: “We
have reason to believe there’s a 2 percent chance this vehicle will have an irreversible defect. As a
result, we are proactively reducing the sticker price by 2 percent.” No reasonable person would
expect you to embargo that rebate until something actually went wrong.
153. Ebin v. Cangadis Food, Inc., 297 F.R.D. 561, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (quoting Gortat v.
Capala Bros., Inc., No. 07-CV-3629 (ILG), 2010 WL 1423018, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 2010).
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defendants have, with intermittent success, attempted to transform the
judge-made ascertainability criterion into a weapon against class
certification by arguing, ultimately, that all class members must not only
be ascertainable, or identifiable, at the class certification stage, but that
they must be identified (and by further extension, that all such identified
class members have provable injuries—or proven damages) at the class
certification stage—the reverse bifurcation effect noted in this Article.
This extension of ascertainability seems to contradict the essential nature
of a class suit as representative action, as well as its utility, in providing
preclusive judgments in situations where class membership is fluid.
Somewhat akin to the religious doctrine of predestination and the
concept of a pre-identified elect of a certain number who will, to the
exclusion of all others, be admitted into heaven, extreme ascertainability
would require the court to identify all class members who will receive
damages at the outset, before threshold liability questions that would
entitle any of them to damages have been certified or tried. This would,
as the Supreme Court noted in a somewhat different context in Amgen,
put “the cart before the horse.”154
The “identification first” school of ascertainability supposedly got a
boost from the Third Circuit’s decision in Carrera, which simply
required better proof at the class certification stage that the class
members could readily be identified later. The Third Circuit’s
subsequent Byrd decision clarified Carrera in ways that move it into the
mainstream. Subsequent appellate decisions from other circuits have, in
other factual circumstances, restored a balance and moved the
ascertainability concept closer to its original meaning and function, as
exemplified in the First Circuit decision affirming class certification in
Nexium.155
VII.CY PRES OR NOT CY PRES? THAT IS THE CHIEF JUSTICE’S QUESTION
Cy pres comme possible (a French term meaning “as near as
possible”), shortened to cy pres,156 refers to the practice, well-established
154. In the Amgen majority’s view, the argument that to gain certification a plaintiff “must
first establish that it will win the day” is to “put the cart before the horse.” Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret.
Plans &Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1211 (2013). “But the offer of a Rule 23(b)(3) certification is
not to adjudicate the case; rather, it is to select the ‘metho[d]’ best-suited to adjudication of the
controversy ‘fairly and efficiently’.” Id. at 1191.
155. See also Steering Comm. v. BP Exploration & Prod. (In re Horizon), 785 F.3d 1003 (5th
Cir. 2015).
156. Pearson v. NBTY, Inc., 772 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 2014); Oetting v. Green Jacobson,
P.C., 775 F.3d 1060, 1063 n.2 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Travel Network Ltd. v. United Airlines, Inc.
(In re Airline Ticket Comm’n AntiTrust Litig.), 268 F.3d 619, 625 (8th Cir. 2001)) (Cy pres
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in class action settlement practice, of distributing the unclaimed residue
of a settlement fund to a worthy recipient, whose mission is sufficiently
related to the claims and issues in the law suit; or if distribution to
claimants, on a direct or claims-made basis, is impractical (for example,
if the amount of individual payments to claimants would be swamped by
the administrative costs of so doing),157 the court may approve a worthy
recipient to receive the money instead. Problems have emerged either
where courts determine that insufficiently diligent efforts have been
made to pay class members or where undue influence or conflict of
interest, real or apparent, may be involved in the selection of the
recipients. To address these emerging issues, the American Law Institute
reviewed the jurisprudence and provided black-letter guidance in § 3.07
of its Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation.158 This provision
was among the less controversial sections of the Aggregate Litigation
project, and many were surprised when it became among the first, and
most frequently, cited of its sections. Courts increasingly looked for
guidance regarding settlement structures including cy pres provisions as
cy pres became a favorite target of class action settlement objectors.
The poster child of cy pres attacks is the Facebook litigation. In
Lane v. Facebook, the plaintiffs had sued Facebook, alleging its new
“beacon” program violated class members’ privacy rights by gathering
“originated as a rule of construction to save a testamentary charitable gift that would otherwise fail,
allowing ‘the next best use of the funds to satisfy the testator’s intent as near as possible.’”).
157. See, e.g., In re Vitamin Cases, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 425 (Cal. App. 2013) (distributing $38
million consumer settlement entirely to food and health-related charities; distribution of fund among
as many as 30 million class members was impracticable; only four class members objected).
158. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIG. § 3.07(2010). A court may approve a
settlement that proposes a cy pres remedy even if such a remedy could not be ordered in a contested
case. The court must apply the following criteria in determining whether a cy pres award is
appropriate:
(a) If individual class members can be identified through reasonable effort, and the distributions are sufficiently large to make individual distributions economically viable, settlement proceeds should be distributed directly to individual class members.
(b) If the settlement involves individual distributions to class members and funds remain
after distributions (because some class members could not be identified or chose not to
participate), the settlement should presumptively provide for further distributions to participating class members unless the amounts involved are too small to make individual
distributions economically viable or other specific reasons exist that would make such
further distributions impossible or unfair.
(c) If the court finds that individual distributions are not viable based upon the criteria set
forth in subjections (a) and (b), the settlement may utilize a cy pres approach. The court,
when feasible, should require the parties to identify a recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class. If, and only if, no recipient whose interests reasonably approximate those being pursued by the class can be identified after
thorough investigation and analysis, a court may approve a recipient that does not reasonably approximate the interests being pursued by the class.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015

39

Akron Law Review, Vol. 48 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 3

796

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[48:757

and disseminating information about their online activities to other
social media without express permission. The parties entered into a $9.5
million settlement, which was approved by the district court and
affirmed by the Ninth Circuit.159 The settlement was, to say the least, an
unusual one, and understandably so. Privacy rights violation litigation is
in its pioneering stages. Where class members’ privacy rights have
allegedly been violated, the right to privacy may be priceless, but is
difficult to monetize. The Federal Wiretap Act and analogous state
statutes may provide for penalties in some instances, but these statutes
do not necessarily cover all activity that occurs online. The Facebook
settlement was, in classical terms, a “cy pres only” settlement. Injunctive
relief was, to be sure, a major element: Facebook agreed to discontinue
the “beacon” program itself. It did not, however, promise to refrain from
instituting a similar, allegedly privacy-infringing program in the future.
After the payment of court-awarded fees, costs, and modest
compensation to the named plaintiffs, the remaining $6.5 million of the
Facebook settlement was used to establish a new charitable foundation
to help fund organizations dedicated to educating the public about online
privacy. The settlement agreement provided for a Facebook
representative to serve as one of three members of the new foundation’s
board.160 These features drew objections, notably that of Megan Marek,
one of the four unnamed class members who raised objections. Ms.
Marek took hers all the way to the Supreme Court after the Ninth Circuit
had affirmed the settlement. The Supreme Court denied the petition for
certiorari. However, the one sentence disposition: “The petition for writ
for certiorari is denied,” was immediately followed by a four page
“Statement” of Chief Justice Roberts respecting the denial of
certiorari.161 This was not a dissent from the denial of certiorari, but a
warning shot on the cy pres issue. After describing the claims in the suit,
the structure of the settlement, and the history of objections and opinions
below, Chief Justice Roberts closed as follows:
I agree with this Court’s decision to deny the petition for certiorari.
Marek’s challenge is focused on the particular features of the specific
cy pres settlement at issue. Granting review of this case might not have
afforded the Court an opportunity to address more fundamental concerns surrounding the use of such remedies in class action litigation,
including when, if ever, such relief should be considered; how to as159. Lane v. Facebook, Inc., 696 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2012), reh’g denied 709 F.3d 791 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied sub nom. Marek v. Lane, 134 S. Ct. 8 (2013).
160. Id. at 821.
161. Marek, 134 S. Ct. 8.
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sess its fairness as a general matter; whether new entities may be established as part of such relief; if not, how existing entities should be selected; what the respective roles of the judge and parties are in shaping
a cy pres remedy; how closely the goals of any enlisted organization
must correspond to the interests of the class; and so on. This Court has
not previously addressed any of these issues. Cy pres remedies, however, are a growing feature of class action settlements. In a suitable
case, this Court may need to clarify the limits on the use of such reme162
dies.

Chief Justice Roberts’ Statement in Marek officially certified cy
pres as a hot button issue. Over-reaction followed immediately, as
settlements-in-process were scoured of their now suspect cy pres
provisions; often, arguably, where such provisions would have been
entirely proper, and perhaps superior, to other remedies. We will never
know how many settlements lost their cy pres provisions or how many
charities or other worthy endeavors were thus denied significant funding
to advance class member interests, particularly in the consumer law
field. Cy pres had simply become branded as a vulnerability to be
avoided if at all possible.
It is, of course, entirely possible to design a cy pres provision that
does not raise any of the caution flags described by Chief Justice Roberts
in the conclusion of his Statement; in its major outlines after all, the
Marek Statement corresponds closely to § 3.07 of the Principles of the
Law of Aggregate Litigation on the same subject.
One circuit, at least, has remained champion of cy pres, in smallrecovery consumer class settlements. The Seventh Circuit, per Judge
Posner in Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enterprise, Inc., reversed the
district court’s decertification of the class.163 The class grievance was
that the defendant’s ATM machines failed to post a notice regarding the
fees charged for their use. This omission violates the Electronic Funds
Transfer Act.164 Plaintiffs who prove violation of the Act are entitled to
actual damages, if any, or to statutory damages of at least $100 but not
more than $1,000. In the class action context, the amount of damages is
capped at the lesser of $500,000 or 1% of the defendant’s net worth.165
No minimum amount of damages, that is, no floor, is provided in class

162. Id. at 8, 9 (citing Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian, & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Pres Relief and
the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L. REV.
617, 653-56 (2010)).
163. Hughes v. Kore of Indiana Enter., Inc., 731 F. 3d 672, 678 (7th Cir. 2013).
164. 15 U.S.C. § 1693b(b)(3) (2012).
165. Id. § 1693m(a)(2)(B)(ii).
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actions. Here, unfortunately, the defendant’s net worth was low: the
parties stipulated that the limit to damages would be $10,000, equaling
1% of Kore’s net worth.166 Thus, Hughes was a low-value class action
with minuscule individual damages; just the sort of case, in Judge
Posner’s recent view, that compels class action treatment.167 Faced with
a worthy class action, but an utterly impractical individual damages
distribution scenario, Judge Posner concluded:
[Because] distribution of damages to the class members would provide
no meaningful relief, the best solution may be what is called (with
some imprecision) a single ‘cy pres’ decree. Such a decree awards to
charity the money that would otherwise go to the members of the class
168
as damages, if distribution to the class members is infeasible.

After conducting a succinct primer on the history and purposes of the cy
pres doctrine, Judge Posner went on to opine that:
[p]ayment of the $10,000 to a charity whose mission coincided with, or
at least overlapped, the interest of the class (such as the foundation
concerned with consumer protection) would amplify the effect of the
modest damages in protecting consumers. A foundation that receives
$10,000 can use the money to do something to minimize violations of
the Electronic Funds Transfer Act; as a practical matter, class members
169
each given $3.57 cannot.

166. Hughes, 731 F. 3d at 674.
167. See id. at 675. See also Chapman v. Wagener Equities, Inc., 747 F.3d 489 (7th Cir.
2014); Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083 (7th Cir. 2014); Driver v. AppleIllinois, LLC, 739
F.3d 1073 (7th Cir. 2014); Phillips v. Asset Acceptance, LLC, 736 F.3d 1076, 1083 (7th Cir. 2013);
Pearson v. NBTY, 772 F.3d 778, 787 (7th Cir. 2014); Redman v. Radioshack Corp., 768 F.3d 622
(7th Cir. 2014).
168. Hughes, 731 F. 3d at 675.
169. Id. at 676 (citing, inter alia, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS, supra note 19, § 10:17, and
Redish, Julian & Zyontz, supra note 162 (the cy pres critical article cited two months later by Chief
Justice Roberts)):
As explained in Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortgage Corp., “cy pres” is the name of a doctrine of
trust law that allows the funds in a charitable trust, if they can no longer be devoted to
the purpose for which the trust was created, to be diverted to a related purpose; and so
when the polio vaccine was developed the March of Dimes Foundation was permitted to
redirect its resources from combating polio to combating other childhood diseases. The
trust doctrine is based on the idea that the settlor would have preferred a modest alteration in the terms of the trust to having the corpus revert to his residuary legatees because
the trust’s original aim could no longer be achieved. In a class action the reason for a
remedy modeled on cy pres is to prevent the defendant from walking away from the litigation scot-free because of the infeasibility of distributing the proceeds of the settlement
to the class members. When there’s not even an indirect benefit to the class from the defendant’s payment of damages, the “cy pres” remedy (misnamed, but the alternative term
found in some cases – “Fluid Recovery” – is misleading too) is purely punitive. But we
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So much for the “good” cy pres class action settlement. More
recently, the Seventh Circuit, in a decision written by the same jurist,
disapproved a settlement featuring cy pres provisions.170 In Pearson, a
settlement involving over-the-counter Glucosamine pills, a $1.13 million
cy pres award was slated to go to an orthopedic foundation. As Judge
Posner observed, since the joint problems that Glucosamine is supposed
to alleviate are the domain of orthopedic medicine, the choice of an
orthopedic institute as a recipient of money left over after all approved
class members’ claims are paid is indeed consistent with cy pres. But
there was “no validity to the $1.13 million cy pres award in this case.”171
Why?
A cy pres award is supposed to be limited to money that can’t feasibly
be awarded to the intended beneficiaries, here consisting of the class
members. Notice costing $1.5 million reached 4.72 million class members. Granted, doubling the expenditure would not have doubled the
number of class members notified . . . [b]ut the claims process could
have been simplified. Or, knowing that 4.72 million people had bought
at least 1 bottle of its pills, Rexall could have mailed $3 checks to all
4.72 million post card recipients. The Orthopedic Research and Education Foundation seems perfectly reputable, but it is entitled to receive
money intended to compensate victims of the consumer fraud only if
it’s infeasible to provide that compensation to the victims—which has
172
not been demonstrated.

A superficial irony emerges from the juxtaposition of Hughes and
Pearson. While a potential individual recovery in the $3 range was so
small as to catalyze Judge Posner’s affirmative recommendation of cy
pres in Hughes, the same level of individual compensation was posited
as superior to the cy pres remedy provided by the settlement in Pearson.
This apparent contradiction is resolved when analyzing the two cases’
very different contexts, and the Seventh Circuit’s consistent concern
with fairness, efficiency, and practicality applied to both. It was simply
inefficient to distribute small amounts of money in Hughes, whereas
said in Marfasihi that the punitive character of the remedy would not invalidate it.. Other
courts, disagreeing, require the charity or other recipient to have an interest parallel to
that of the class. No matter; it should be possible in this case to find a charity concerned
with consumer protection issues of the general character presented by the case.
Id. (citing Mirfasihi v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., 356 F.3d 781, 784-85 (7th Cir. 2004); In re Lupron
Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 677 F.3d 21, 33 (1st Cir. 2012); Nachshin v. AOL, LLC, 663 F.3d
1034, 1038-39 (9th Cir. 2011)).
170. Pearson v. NBTY, INC., 772 F. 3d 778 (7th Cir. 2014).
171. Id. at 784.
172. Id.
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aggregating that same sum could have delivered more powerful, albeit
indirect, benefit to consumers through cy pres. In Pearson, which
involved a far larger class action settlement, Judge Posner saw practical
alternatives to simplify, expedite, and render more efficient the delivery
of more of the settlement fund to class members, by a simplified claims
process or by dispensing with the claims process entirely and directly
mailing checks to all Rexall’s identifiable claimants. This suggestion
resonates with true consumer advocacy, since a direct relationship
between low claims rates (and unpaid class benefits) and cumbersome,
complex, or restrictive claims procedures, has long been observed.
In Pearson, Judge Posner both makes the observation and proposes
the solution. In Pearson, cy pres was not inherently wrong, nor was its
proposed beneficiary unworthy: there was simply a better approach
(direct payment to class members) which had not been fully explored.
VIII.CONCLUSION: THE CLASS ACTION LIVES
The Roberts Court has subjected the class action to more frequent
and searching scrutiny than has occurred during any other decade since
the modern class action was created by the 1966 amendments to Rule
23. As a result, the process of class certification has become more
rigorous, more protracted, more expensive, and more uncertain. Those
dedicated to the preservation of the class mechanism as a form uniquely
suited to serve the necessary functions of compensation and deterrence,
in the context of our mass production, mass communication, and mass
transaction society, justly decry these additional burdens and urge a rollback to simpler times. The First, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, most
notably of late, have shown that the straightforward application of
enduring Rule 23 principles to produce the fair and efficient
adjudication—or resolution—of core questions is not only still available,
but may again be on the rise.173 The good news is thus that the class
action has survived and that its core functions, as well as its fundamental
structure, are largely intact, to be invoked—where litigation itself is still
allowed—for the benefit of those who cannot afford to incur the high
cost and expend the sustained effort of modern litigation on their own. In
the words of Arthur Miller, present at the birth of the modern class
action, aggregate litigation is “an idea that is ‘too big to fail.’”174 Having
run and re-run the gauntlet of Supreme Court scrutiny for nearly 50
years, in sickness and in health, the class form yet lives. May it yet
173.
174.

See Miller, supra note 15, at 325-27.
Id. at 326.
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abide, improved as need be, to serve the good of the many in our
uniquely challenging time; and to preserve for adjudication those
trespasses to our economic and personal rights and interests that our
individual resources, or those of the courts themselves, do not permit us
to effectively pursue alone.
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